nots on Tony Smith 3

“In about 1962, I became intolerant of the capriciousness of clients and I gave up building. I had some steel boxes made and placed them around my yard. I don’t know exactly what my intentionas were.”

Tony Smith in: Eugen C. Goossen, Nine Sculptures by Tony Smith, catalog, 1970

more notes on Tony Smith 2 – on silhouette

[Smith's new works] lie low and express even more fully his distaste for silhouette in sculpture.  Those who exploit silhouette in a three-dimensional work effectually eliminate one of the three dimensions; the very purpose of sculpture as such is thus lost and the piece becomes pictorial. The silhouette of a Smith piece is more or less an accident and because it tells little about whqat the piece actually in essence is, attention is necessarily directed toward mass as described by the directional force of the surfaces.

Eugen C. Goossen, Nine Sculptures by Tony Smith, catalog, 1970.

more notes on Tony Smith

“Whereas most sculpture in recent years has attempted to transcend objectness by emphasizing the symbolic content of the work, Smith’s pieces transcend objectness by emphasizing the symbolic content of the experience of the work. You cannot talk about the meaning of a Tony Smith sculpture without talking about your feelings about it.”

Eugen C. Goossen, Nine Sculptures by Tony Smith, catalog, 1970.

notes on michael fried WHY PHOTOGRAPHY

My notes on M. Fried WHY PHOTOGRAPHY MATTERS AS ART AS NEVER BEFORE (2007)

Fried indeed refines his judgement from the Art and Objecthood essay in this text. But it becomes also very clear, that the enterprise here is not a revision but instead a reactualisation of his position with an important refinement, which is a differentiation between “bad” or ”abstract” objectness and “good” or “specific” objectness. Fried discusses several photo artists with his terminological toolbox, which he has not changed since the 60s: absorption, exclusion, presentness on the one side and immersion, indeterminacy, theatricality and presence/objectness on the other. Also the argumentation, that absorption (as effect) and presentness (as quality of the work) is aesthetically esteemed over immersion (as effect) and presence or objectness (as quality of work) has not changed. But you can say that he opens his catalog of valuable works to (some) photography.

One object of the book is: “to bring the entire question of antitheatricality in contemporary art photography into the open as regards both the works themselves and, wherever relevant, the discourse around them.” (344)

What remains puzzling to me in tis is the differentiation between the motiv of a photo (the thing as it exists in the factual) and the photo itself. He discusses this extensivly in the chapter on the Bechers, but I either have not understood or he has not throughly solved this distinction. Clearly he is on the search for the individual object, the object, that is not generic and that can be or should be seen sub specie aeternitatis (from the persepctive of eternity) as he says quoting Wittgenstein. Fried interprets this sub specie aeternitatis as “clearly implies that we behold it [the work of art] as if it had nothing to do with us, indeed as if it were in its deepest being oblivious or indifferent to our existence.” An example for such good objecthood would be Welling’s plank in the beginning of the chapter but also Bechers’ industrial towers, who, through the technique of serialism, become individualized. My question here is, what becomes individualized and what is the good object, the motive or its photo?

If it is the plank (the tower) – he quotes extensively to show, that “in their [the Bechers] eyes, the technical installations were ‘objects’, not motifs. The photo is merely a substitute for the object, it is useless as a picture in the usual sense of the word.” (Armin Zweifel in Fried 321) OR “surrogate objects” (ebd) – is he really discussing the photos as art works or rather their motives?

Fried is not ignorant of this distinction, but I could not follow him in clarifying it. He states at the beginning that he (and Welling) was interested in “qualities pertaining to objects that can only be revealed or manifested in and by the art of photography (no “good” objecthood tout court).” (304)

I understand that only photography has this documentarian quality which makes the object as such come to the fore. You can of course say the same about the art of Stilleben – an art that is wholly concerned with “the thingness of the object” (303) while staging and faking it continously all the same. A comparison between photography and Stilleben under this very aspect of (anti-)theatricality, would be interesting and instructive!

So what do we have:

Fried criticized Minimalist art for „the projection of objecthood as a means of bringing about a particular sort of open-ended yet also rigorously controlled relationship among the work in question, the embodied viewer, and the gallery space within which the encounter between the first two was arranged to take place.“ (303)

So there are two things at work here: „the project of objecthood“ AND „the open ended relationship/theatricality“ of the situation. It is clear, that the latter does not take place in photography, since the object in question is so to speak banned from the space the beholder occupies, it is removed enough to not engage the beholder in anything other than absorption, longing possibly. The photo on the wall is clearly a picture – not an object – and can therefore be contemplated as such. But that is only one aspect, we can cal it the spatialor situational aspect of the situation. The other aspect, is the content of the picture and within this there Fried sees a kind of “objectness” that he judges as pure or individual.

Is the question than one of making us believe in the factual objectness of the motive: does this really exist and look like this? is it really there? Fried seems to me to imply that in painting, this question about the ontology of the motive never appeared but does so in photography. I agree to some respect. In fact, when looking at a photo, the question of how and where and when this was taken DOES PLAY A ROLE, while i would say that it does not in painting. The photo is therefore rooted in a social interaction between motive, location of the shot and the artist. There must have been a moment of presence there (even in Gursky’s or Wall’s highly digitalized and unreal photos). So the photo – as a work of art – is somehow also extending beyond what is there to see. There is the element of a story here and therefore – you could say – duration, indeterminacy, theater….

But Fried does not call this (the indeterminacy at play in photos) “non-art” but instead he calls this “good objectness”.

Fried uses Wittgenstein’s sub specie aeternitatis to explain once more his idea of anti-theatricality, “outsideness” as he calls it:

“Wittgenstein makes a fundamental distinction between the ordinary object (der Gegenstand) as it is in itself and the “individual thing” (das Einzelne) as presented by the artist. My thought at this juncture is that the latter, “das Einzelne”, amounts to a version of what I have been calling “good” or “genuine” objecthood. Wittgenstein further indicates that “das Einzelne” is in effect seen sub specie aeternitatis, which whatever else it means clearly implies that we behold it as if it had nothing to do with us, indeed as if it were in its deepest being oblivious or indifferent to our existence.” (328)

Wittgenstein: “The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis (from the persepctive of eternity); and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connection between art and ethics. The common way of looking at things sees objects as it were from out of their midst, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside.”

[The Becher's typologies evoke] the viewer’s “outsideness” from the “world” of objects they evoke (or should I say, conjure), as opposed to standing in the “midst” of those objects as one does in ordinary life. (328 f.)

Fried here wants to prove that the Becher’s oeuvre is indeed art. I would agree and I would also agree with his definition of art. But I would argue, that there is no absolute outside position but only a relational one (as any position is by the way). I would also say, that this is not a historic process, but that art has always been seen in such a relational way, as the experience of an atmosphere, a space that is occupied by the work, the motive and the beholder.

Instead Fried says in ART AND OBJECTHOOD: “Whereas in previous art what is to be had from the work is located strictly within it, the experience of literalist art is of an object in a situation – one that, virtually by definition, includes the beholder.” (323)

Is this not instead just a question of perspectives? That is why, Böhme speaks of artistic situations altogether, not even bothering with the distinction between ”within the work” and outside of it.

Further quotes:

“It is possible to see [James Welling's photograph of a] plank as a real world analogue to the California minimalist John McCracken’s high gloss „abstract“ planks leaning against gallery walls that were a feature of the avantgarde-scene in the late 1960s. But the concern in Welling’s photograph with the specificity of this particular two-by-four, with its individual history and identifying nicks and blemishes, comes out the other side of minimalism into the world of the real and not “generic” objects. (From this point of view, the trouble with Donald Judd’s Specific Objects was that they were never specific enough.) Another way of characterizing Welling’s focus [...] might be to speak of an interest in real as opposed to abstract literalness or even in “good” as distinct from “bad” objecthood, understanding by the first term in both oppositions qualities pertaining to objects that can only be revealed or manifested in and by the art of photography (no “good” objecthood tout court).” (304)

Wittgenstein:

“The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis (from the persepctive of eternity); and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connection between art and ethics.

The common way of looking at things sees objects as it were from out of their midst, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside.

Such that they have the whole world as background.

Is it perhaps this – that it [the latter mode of beholding] sees the object with space and time instead of in space and time?

Each thing modifies the whole logical world, the whole of logical space, so to speak. The thought forces itself upon me: The thing seen sub specie aeternitatis is the thing seen together with the whole logical space.” (328)

“Smith’s Die is (for me in Art and Objecthood) a work of almost pure theatricality, depending as it does on enticing the viewer into a kind of indeterminate, open-ended situation of which the hollow steel cube itself is only one ingredient.” (333)

Historic Development of “the project of exclusion” (344):

1) “Manet was the decisive figure in the liquidation of the Diderotian ideal of establishing the ontological fiction that the beholder does not exist, that there is no one before the painting. As was mentioned in Chapter Two, that fiction was principally to be sustained by depicting figures who appeared wholly absorbed in what they were thinking, feeling and doing, and who, if there were more than one of them, also appeared caught up in strongly unified actional and compositional gestalts. In fact the Diderotian project ran into difficulties at an early date, and in the work of Manet’s immediate predecessor, Gustave Courbet, one discovers a far more radical, indeed hyperbolic strategy with respect to the beholder, according to which the painter-beholder – to whom Courbet’s operations are in effect limited – seeks to merge all but corporeally with the painting coming into being under his brush. (If such merger could be achieved, the painter beholder would no longer find himself before the canvas.)” (340)

To-be-seenness:

“the posedness and constructedness of [Jeff Wall's] compositions [is] an acknowledgment I have also described as of his pictures’ to-be-seenness, a notion related to theatricality but not, I have suggested, identical with it.” (341)

“The diverse currents that flow into Gursky’s work emerge as the coherent picture of a world. There is no place for us in that world. Banished from its commanding symmetries, we are consigned to contemplate its wholeness from without. We may study its details at our leisure. We may be beguilded or repelled by the gorgeous spectacle. We may marvel at its serene indifference. We may even elect ourselves to sit in judgment upon it, but we will never become participants.” (344)

on the beholder:

“the mobile and self-consciously “experiencing” subject of minimalism/literalism” (344)

indeterminacy:

“indeterminacy, that is the notion that the meaning of a given work is simply what it turns out to be for individual subjects.” (345)

OPPOSITION: PRESENTNESS and PRESENCE

PRESENTNESS – denies duration, not objectness, absorption

PRESENCE – Objecthood, exploits duration, theatrical (352)

Raum und Objekt

du schreibst, der black cube ist wie eine balaclava. warum? du meinst vermutlich: der black cube ist (wie) ein verschleiertes gesicht. also ein mensch, den wir als solchen erkennen, ohne sein angesicht zu sehen. der black cube ist charakterlos. er ist generisch, nicht individuell. das gleiche gilt für den maskierten. Und da ist der 2007er Text von Fried wichtig. Fried sagt: generic objectness is bad objectness, specific objectness is good objectness. in diesem sinne kritisiert er die minimalisten: ” the trouble with Donald Judd’s Specifiic Objects was that they were never specific enough.”

Deine Idee mit der Maske stimmt also in diesem sinne.

Was passiert bei der maskierung?

1) ich vermute, dass eine maskierung NICHT GRUNDSÄTZLICH ENTMENSCHLICHT. ich erkenne ja immer noch die menschlichkeit hinter der maske und verhalte mich dementsprechend. was tut sie dann? welche rolle spielt das ANGESICHT?

2) entfremdet die maske? schafft sie eine alterität, vergleichbar der alterität, die du beim black cube immer hervorgehoben hast?

ich möchte aber auf etwas anderes hinweisen, weil es mir in dem zusammendenken von hartmut böhme und michael fried aufgegangen ist.

böhme schreibt:

“Kunstwerke an sich und für sich sind nicht weniger tot als Steine – so wie Steine im ästhetischen Prozeß nicht weniger lebendig sind als Kunstwerke oder Tiere. Das liegt daran, daß der ästhetische Raum nicht Subjekt und Objekt scheidet und folglich auch einen Objektraum nicht nach organisch – anorganisch, künstlich – natürlich, tot – lebendig usw. aufteilt.”

wichtig ist mir nicht die idee von lebendig oder tot, sondern “daß der ästhetische Raum nicht Subjekt und Objekt scheidet”. Das ist eine der zentralen Thesen bei böhme. die ästhetische situation wäre dann ein (zeitlicher) raum, in dem ich mich befinde, ein raum um mich und das werk, bzw. ein raum, den das werk und ich aufmachen (heideggers definition von raum).

was bedeutet das jetzt für die ethik? wir sind in einem raum und beeinflussen uns folglich gegenseitig. gemeinsam in einem raum zu sein, beduetet, diesen raum zu verhandeln, also regeln und positionen miteinander auszuhandeln.

in jedem fall glaube ich, dass da der unterschied liegt zwischen object und painting (oder sculptur): ein raum in dem ich mich MIT etwas oder jemand anderem befinde, das ist die situation der objectness. ein bild dagegen ist in diesem sinne NICHT ANWESEND, bzw. löst den Raum auf, also bin auch ICH NICHT ANWESEND.

ich glaube, dass der entscheidende punkt beim cube der ist, dass er einen raum mit mir eröffnet, anstatt einen raum zum verschwinden zu bringen. wie können wir damit im video umgehen? wie kann man einen solchen filmischen raum herstellen?

wenn mich ein gesicht von der videoprojektion ansieht, geschieht das nicht. hier handelt es sich nicht um objectness, hier wird kein gemeinsamer raum eröffnet. macht es hierfür einen unterschied, ob der mensch maskiert ist oder nicht?

ALSO NOCHMAL ZURÜCK:

Mit der Maske hast du einen wirklich wichtigen Punkt getroffen, nämlich den aspekt des generischen. insofern ist das eine entsprechung EINES aspekts des black cube. aber geht es darum, also eine entsprechung zu finden für den cube?

Was wollen wir mit dem Video?

wir wollen einen kleinen kommentar zur ethik in der ästhetischen situation geben. Richtig?
Also von der erfahrung einen kleinen schritt in die ethik gehen, die – so unsere deutung – für diese ästhetisches erfahrung wichtig ist. ist dafür der aspekt des generischen wichtig? wenn ja warum.

Ich versuche hier eine begründung, an die ich selbst nicht glaube, aber wer weiß…. es ist die einzige, die mir jetzt einfällt:

wenn der cube keine versenkung zulässt, weil er, wie didi schreibt, eine höhlung sei, dann lässt das maskierte gesicht vielleicht auch keine versenkung zu. das würde aber bedeuten, dass das menschliche antlitz ohne maske versenkung ermöglicht, das wäre die logische folge. das menschliche antlitz als bild. das würde natürlich der ganzen ethischen linie von buber und levinas widersprechen. denn für sie ist das antlitz eben das gegenteil eines bildes.

ANTWORT auf balaclava

Antwort auf deine idee und deinen text:

ich finde die filmische idee sehr schön, aber ich weiß auch nicht, wo das hinführen kann oder sollte. an dem punkt, an dem dein text aufhört, weiß ich auch nicht weiter.

du schreibst, der black cube ist wie eine balaclava. warum? du meinst vermutlich: der black cube ist (wie) ein verschleiertes gesicht. also ein mensch, den wir als solchen erkennen, ohne sein angesicht zu sehen. der black cube ist charakterlos. er ist generisch, nicht individuell. das gleiche gilt für den maskierten. Und da ist der 2007er Text von Fried wichtig. Fried sagt: generic objectness is bad objectness, specific objectness is good objectness. in diesem sinne kritisiert er die minimalisten: ” the trouble with Donald Judd’s Specifiic Objects was that they were never specific enough.”

Deine Idee mit der Maske stimmt also in diesem sinne.

Was passiert bei der maskierung?

1) ich vermute, dass eine maskierung NICHT GRUNDSÄTZLICH ENTMENSCHLICHT. ich erkenne ja immer noch die menschlichkeit hinter der maske und verhalte mich dementsprechend. was tut sie dann? welche rolle spielt das ANGESICHT?

2) entfremdet die maske? schafft sie eine alterität, vergleichbar der alterität, die du beim black cube immer hervorgehoben hast?

ich möchte aber auf etwas anderes hinweisen, weil es mir in dem zusammendenken von hartmut böhme und michael fried aufgegangen ist.

böhme schreibt:

“Kunstwerke an sich und für sich sind nicht weniger tot als Steine – so wie Steine im ästhetischen Prozeß nicht weniger lebendig sind als Kunstwerke oder Tiere. Das liegt daran, daß der ästhetische Raum nicht Subjekt und Objekt scheidet und folglich auch einen Objektraum nicht nach organisch – anorganisch, künstlich – natürlich, tot – lebendig usw. aufteilt.”

wichtig ist mir nicht die idee von lebendig oder tot, sondern “daß der ästhetische Raum nicht Subjekt und Objekt scheidet”. Das ist eine der zentralen Thesen bei böhme. die ästhetische situation wäre dann ein (zeitlicher) raum, in dem ich mich befinde, ein raum um mich und das werk, bzw. ein raum, den das werk und ich aufmachen (heideggers definition von raum).

was bedeutet das jetzt für die ethik? wir sind in einem raum und beeinflussen uns folglich gegenseitig. gemeinsam in einem raum zu sein, beduetet, diesen raum zu verhandeln, also regeln und positionen miteinander auszuhandeln.

in jedem fall glaube ich, dass da der unterschied liegt zwischen object und painting (oder sculptur): ein raum in dem ich mich MIT etwas oder jemand anderem befinde, das ist die situation der objectness. ein bild dagegen ist in diesem sinne NICHT ANWESEND, bzw. löst den Raum auf, also bin auch ICH NICHT ANWESEND.

was soll das jetzt alles für das video? ich glaube, dass der entscheidende punkt beim cube der ist, dass er einen raum mit mir eröffnet, anstatt einen raum zum verschwinden zu bringen. wie können wir damit im video umgehen? wie kann man einen solchen filmischen raum herstellen?

wenn mich ein gesicht von der videoprojektion ansieht, geschieht das nicht. hier handelt es sich nicht um objectness, hier wird kein gemeinsamer raum eröffnet. macht es hierfür einen unterschied, ob der mensch maskiert ist oder nicht?

ALSO NOCHMAL ZURÜCK:

Mit der Maske hast du einen wirklich wichtigen Punkt getroffen, nämlich den aspekt des generischen. insofern ist das eine entsprechung EINES aspekts des black cube. aber geht es darum, also eine entsprechung zu finden für den cube?

Was wollen wir mit dem Video?

wir wollen einen kleinen kommentar zur ethik in der ästhetischen situation geben. Richtig?
Also von der erfahrung einen kleinen schritt in die ethik gehen, die – so unsere deutung – für diese ästhetisches erfahrung wichtig ist. ist dafür der aspekt des generischen wichtig? wenn ja warum.

Ich versuche hier eine begründung, an die ich selbst nicht glaube, aber wer weiß…. es ist die einzige, die mir jetzt einfällt:

wenn der cube keine versenkung zulässt, weil er, wie didi schreibt, eine höhlung sei, dann lässt das maskierte gesicht vielleicht auch keine versenkung zu. das würde aber bedeuten, dass das menschliche antlitz ohne maske versenkung ermöglicht, das wäre die logische folge. das menschliche antlitz als bild. das würde natürlich der ganzen ethischen linie von buber und levinas widersprechen. denn für sie ist das antlitz eben das gegenteil eines bildes.

BLACK CUBE concept January 2010

notes of our discussion:

1) The subject of the LP is the situation as described by Michael Freid in his 1967 essay Art and Objecthood: the “strongly disquieting experience of coming upon a literal object”. We have no clear indication where and when this situation took place, Fried describes it in generic terms, but we have to assume that he himself – or at least someone – made this experience: feeling as if… So for better understanding we henceforth call this person Michael Fried and use his text as a document of this situation.

2) This situation was created by or with an object entitled Black Cube, by TonySmith. The art work by Smith is not the situation, it is the object only, meaning that we can not know if Smith intended to create this situation or not. In any case, he is the initiator of the object’s realisation and display (initiator because he neither „made“ nor „put“ the object anywhere himself, but had it fabricated and set up by other people on his request) So Tony Smith stands at the beginning of a narrative, that eventually leads into this situation. This narrative of course includes other protagonists, places and situations, first and foremost of course the visitor/spectator, but also the museum space, curator etc pp.

3) The interesting quality of this situation for us is that being in a museum, Fried experiences a situation that is „theatrical“, holds the qualities of theater. There is a shift occuring from one mode of art encounter (visual arts, museum) to another (object, theater) or at least a confusion between the first and the latter mode, creating this „strongly disquieting experience“. This, Fried explains, is brought forht by the „literalist“ quality of the object. (I will not discuss this here, see Fried or our blog on Black Cube)

4) If this situation is the subject of the LP, our task is to create a NEW situation that produces a similar experience of shift or confusion to that of the original situation while distancing the audience from it and allowing them to reflect on it. This WHILE can mean one single situation or a temporal and spatial sequence of situations tied together to form one LP. We can hence speak of a re-enactment of this original situation with an additional quality or element. (???)

4b) We should also reflect on our role in this, where and what position we hold as the authors and lecturers of this LP. Ideally we manage to include and disquiet our position IN the situations we create!

5) The conditions – What needs to be taken in account:

- the historic difference between 1967 and today: there are some qualities of the original situation that are strongly tied to the historic situation and others that are nor a) the shock or provocation is strongly tied to the newness of the object, (connected to that) the element of provocation, the different cultural and media surrounding, the different art scene, technical and industrial developments etc pp. b) the objectiveness (or literality) is not tied to these factors but can be regarded as superhistorical – at least as the difference between 1960 and now is concerned.

- the theater(-festival)setting we are presenting in: the audience’s expectations are towards a theater event and they will hence display a theater behavior. So the outset is contrary to the original situation: here we start from theater (or lecture-performance) and shift to visual arts/museum. In addition we are dealing with the format of lecture, which also needs to be taken in account.

6) A list of the means for creation our situation:

- the space (open or closed)

- light (theatrical, presentation, normal…)

- performance by us or a museum guide ( a very theatrical element)

- duration

- audiomaterial to be injected in the situation to a) create atmosphere or b) narrative or c) to structure the time

-the object itself – when do we have it present, how do we use it’s presence

- text, lecture

BLACK CUBE ZITAT

“The most interesting characteristic of the cube is that it is relatively uninteresting.”

Sol LeWitt

Notes on: Brian O’Doherty “Inside the White Cube” Pt 3

Chapter 4 – Die Galerie als Gestus

The last chapter I made notes on is the one about the ARTISTIC GESTURE, as was mentioned in the first chapter. I like this term, I find it quite transparent and useful. I used it before for the talk w/ Marga van Mechelen in Amsterdam:

In his essay THE GALLERY AS GESTURE, Brian O’Doherty defines the ARTISTIC GESTURE as a singular artistic action, an individualist, daring act. The successful gesture created a narrative, became a story by changing history. He writes furthermore that these gestures – in his case gallery performances and installations mostly of the nineteen-sixties – always had two audiences, one present and another one not present, which, as he writes, „is usually us“. We, as this second audience, are looking back at the „event“ of a performance as a historical fact, an occurrence.

O’Doherty furthermore says that the original audience is usually not appreciative, often nervous, not at all pleased. It is only in retrospect that we learn to appreciate the gesture. The photos of these events give us an opportunity “an einer Art von Schöpfungsakt teilzunehmen.” (101)

All these gestures are transformations of the given situation in one way or another. What makes them potent, I believe, is that they are stop signs, or rather they are the stops themselves in the train of events, interruptions in the business as usual:

“Erfolgreiche Gesten – das sind solche, die ihre Präsentationsform überleben – unterbrechen normalerweise den Dialog, der sich auf die akzeptierten Normen des Diskurses bezieht. Beim Spiel nennt man das Modifikation der Regeln. Diese Gesten besitzen ein Element von Scharlatanerie und Wahrsagerei. Sie setzen auf eine undeutlich wahrgenommene, aber wünschenswerte Zukunft.“ (127)

The gallery gestures start with Duchamps, continue on with Yves Klein, Armand, Daniel Spoerri, Andy Warhol and Kaprow and many others. It is therefore not an American tradition, but it became quite alive in New York in the 1960s. Many of these gestures can be described as parody, mocking the art business, but many of them really challenged the spectator, the gallery space and what is meant by art and showing art.

There are several categories of gestures, those that question the gallery space altogether are of course in the minority. O’Doherty points out that at least the American avant-garde never really questioned the gallery space as an idea, except for one brief moment when artists did their performances and events in the landscape and only brought photos back to the gallery. (109)

There are however two other examples: namely in 1968, when Daniel Buren sealed a gallery in Milano (110) and in 1969, when Robert Barry published in an art magazine the following add: “During the exhibition the gallery will be closed.” Which then took place a few months later (114) The other category would be gestures that question the perception of the spectator, for example by use of extreme light or darkness. Here often the spectator himself becomes the art piece. These are classic examples of transgression, in the sense that the spectator not only is inside the artwork, he himself generates the artwork out of himself. „Seiner Sicht beraubt, hielt [der Zuschauer] sich an sich selbst und entwickelte aus sich den Inhalt des Ereignisses. [In einem Instant-Kunstwerk] verschmelzen die beiden Träger von Erwartungen, die Galerie und der Betrachter, im weißen Raum zu einem einzigen System.“ (117)

„Die Minimal Art reduzierte die Reize und steigerte die Resonanz, indem sie sie auf das System bezog.“ (117)

This means that for the lack of perceivable objects, the situation itself (the system: the rules, the methods of presentation and behaviour and so forth) becomes interesting and visible. This is a strategy of exposure or disclosure by taking something else (the art object) away, particularly where it’s intentions are political.

The political exposures would form the third strand of gestures. Aimed for example at the art market, admission to art exhibitions and so on.

Another strategy would be to include the outside world in the gallery space and dissolve the gallery hereby. For example bringing people or plants, animals in the space. This can of course also result in trangressions, since the contemplative perception becomes endangered.

Notes on: Brian O’Doherty “Inside the White Cube” Pt 2

Chapter 2: Das Auge und der Betrachter

In this chapter he elaborates further the role of the eye and the body in modern art. His thesis is that the attack on the space is what really made modernism scary and discomforting for its audience. So not the objects themselves, or what they depicted or how they depicted it, but how they changed the spectators sense of space and self.

“Der Energieaustausch zwischen verschiedenen Raumkonzepten, die in Kunstwerken Wirklichkeit werden, und dem Raum, den wir besetzen, gehört zu den grundlegenden und bisher kaum begriffenen Kräften der Moderne. Der Raum der modernen Kunst definiert den Status des Betrachters neu, fordert sein Selbstverständnis heraus. Es sind die Raumkonzeptionen der Moderne und nicht ihre Sujets, welche das Publikum als bedrohlich empfindet.“ (38)

I only quote a few things from this chapter. Somehow I found the examples he gave in the other chapters more inspiring than his reflections in this chapter.

The example of Kurt Schwitters Merzbau that he quotes is interesting because we only have the descriptions of eye witnesses, the space itself – presumably the first installation piece of modernism – was destroyed 1942 in the war. There exist meanwhile some reconstructions of at least large parts of the original space. I visited one in Baden Baden and it was particularly striking, because from the outside you could see that it is build in a wooden box or rather as a pile of wooden boxes with an opening in one of them. In other words, the space looked a bit like a painting that was just transported here in these huge art cases. Very strange! These are my pics from the outside:

the inside:  www.merzbau.org

O’Doherty names two directions (traditions – Gene Swenson) of early modernism: cubism and collage. While the eye accompanies the so called synthetic kubism which redefines the surface, the collage challenges the body. They – eye and body – meet again in the colour field modernism, because these works are both spatial and flat. (61) Minimal art, he says, called for cooperation between eye and body:

„Zuerst nahm das Auge von dem Objekt wie von einem Gemälde Besitz, und dann führte der Körper das Auge um das Werk herum. Dies bewirkte ein feedback zwischen der Bestätigung der Erwartung und der bis dahin latent gebliebenen körperlichen Empfindung. Auge und Betrachter verschmelzen dabei nicht miteinander, sondern arbeiten aus gegebenem Anlass zusammen. Das fein eingestellte Auge erhielt einige Sinnesdaten von der Seite des Körpers, den es verlassen hatte (Empfindung von Schwerkraft, Bewegung etc.). […] Der Betrachter und das Auge sind die Notare unserer Erfahrung. Sie begleiten uns, wenn wir eine Galerie betreten, und die Einsamkeit unserer Kunstwanderungen ist obligatorisch, weil wir die ganze Zeit ein kleines Seminar mit unseren Stellvertretern halten. In diesem Sinne sind wir nicht da. Vor einem Kunstwerk gegenwärtig zu sein, heißt, dass wir uns zugunsten von Auge und Betrachter absentieren, die uns berichten, was wir gesehen hätten, wären wir da gewesen. Das abwesende Kunstwerk ist uns oft näher als das gegenwärtige. (Ich glaube, dass Rothko dies besser als jeder andre Künstler verstand.) Diese komplexe Struktur der Kunstwahrnehmung ist unser Trip nach „Anderswo“, sie ist eine fundamentale Bedingung unserer provisorisch eingerichteten moderne Identität, die von unseren labilen Sinnen immer wieder aufgerichtet wird.“ (63 / 65)

I am not sure I really understand his point here. (I quoted it before.) I get the idea of being absent because we are constantly negotiating between eye and body. But why is the absent artwork more present? And why is the artwork absent in Rothko’s work?

There are also two different aspects here: the modern identity and looking at art. Does our modern identity make us look at art this way? Or does art force us to look at it that way? (Which he seems to imply when describing how the changed art works challenged the perspective)

“Die ersten Betrachter impressionistischer Bilder müssen eine Menge Schwierigkeiten gehabt haben. Wenn sie versuchten, einen Bildgegenstand zu verifizieren, und dazu näher traten, dann verschwand er. Der Betrachter wurde gezwungen, vor- und zurück zu gehen, um einiger Inhaltsbruchstücke teilhaftig zu werden, bevor sie sich auflösten. Das Bild war nicht länger ein passives Objekt sondern erteilte Anweisungen. Fragen des Verhaltens begleiten seitdem die Geschichte der modernen Kunst.“ (65)

This is of course interesting, because it relates directly to minimalism and the black cube in particular. You can relate this directly to the quote from Friedrich Meschede.

This idea of absence and presence we should really work on more, in regard to the black cube but also in regard to our general ideas of situation!